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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1987, the Indiana Supreme Court confronted head-on the issue
of whether administrative agency decisions could be given res judicata
or collateral estoppel effect in subsequent proceedings in McClanahan
v. Remington Freight Lines, 1nc. 1 This Article addresses the historical
precedents for application of the two doctrines in administrative law;
discusses the impact of the supreme court's decision in McClanahan,
and reviews the issues likely to arise in future, similar instances.
The doctrine of res judicata stems from the basic principle that a
matter which has been litigated and determined should not be re-litigated.
Litigation must be final. 2 Res judicata itself is also known as claim
preclusion. Claim preclusion means that a previous adjudication of an
action is a total bar to the same action in a subsequent suit. 3 A derivative
of res judicata is collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion.
Issue preclusion generally does not work to bar a claim in toto, though
it may as a practical matter have that effect. Rather, issue preclusion
functions only to prevent a party from re-litigating a particular factually-

•

• Associate, Lowe, Gray, Steele and Hoffman, Indianapolis. Former Law Clerk
to the Honorable Patrick D. Sullivan, Indiana Court of Appeals. A.B., Wabash College,
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1. 517 N..E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988).
2. See State v. Gurecki, 247 Ind. 218, 214 N.E.2d 392 (1966); Barker v. State,
244 lnd. 267, 191 N.E.2d 9 (1963).
3. Hardesty v. Bolerjack,. 441 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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oriented issue in a subsequent action, even if the causes of action in
the two cases differ. 4
.
The basic requirements for res judicata are: (l) a court of competent
jurisdiction, (2) a final judgment on the merits, (3) between the same
parties or their privies, (4) on all matters essential to that judgment
which were or might have been litigated. 5 The basic requirements for
collateral estoppel are (1) the same parties, (2) actually litigated the point
subsequently at issue, and (3) both would have been bound by the
determination had it been adverse to them. 6
.

.

II.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

A.

Indiana Law

Perhaps unwittingly, Indiana courts began sanctioning the use of
res judicata to give preclusive effect to an agency decision nearly one
hundred years ago. In Bass Foundry & Machine Works v. Board of
Commissioners/ a contractor abandoned the county's project to build
a courthouse and jail. Bass Foundry, a subcontractor, agreed with the
county to complete its iron work on the project at the original contract
price, notwithstanding the fact that iron prices.had doubledin the interim.
In return, the county agreed to pay Bass Foundry all amounts due and
owing under the original contract despite a previous court determination
which held that the county did not have the authority to agree to pay
the full contract price.8 Bass Foundry then filed its claim with the county
commissioners, who subsequently denied payment. No appeal of the
commissioners' decision was taken. Instead, an independent action was
instituted.
The county alleged the previou·s resolution of the issue (denial by
the county commissioners) was a bar to Bass Foundry's subsequent suit.
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed, citing an 1879 statute which deprived
circuit courts of jurisdiction in cases involving County Commissioners,
except when an appeal was taken from the County Commissioners,
decision. Had the case been left to that statutory, jurisdictional point
alone, there would have been little to commend it as a case giving res
judicata effect to an administrative decision. The supreme court went
beyond the statutory basis, however, and noted: "The purpose of filing
•

4.

S.
of Moser.
6.
7.
8.
593 (1888).

Id.
See Coulson v. State, 488 N.E.2d 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); In reMarriage
469 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
Hardesty, 441 N .E.2d at 245.
141 Ind. 68, 32 N.E. 112S (1894).
Bass Foundry & Machine Works v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 115 Ind. 234, 17 N.E.
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the claim before the board of commissioners was to recover the claim
from the county, and that is the purpose and object of this suit, and
the question is res judicata . . . . '' 9
The Bass Foundry analysis cleaves remarkably close to the analysis
given to the issue today. The supreme court noted that the identity of
the issues was the same in the court case and the administrative litigation:
recovery of sums allegedly due under the second contract. Identity of
issues is, of course, a keystone to modern res judicata decisions. The
Bass Foundry court went further and noted that the identity of the
parties was also the same: the county was, as the court termed it, a
"real party in interest." 10 The court reasoned that addition of the original
defaulting contractor as a party could not defeat this congruity of
. identities. 11 Again, the Bass Foundry court, having little or no difficulty
according the Commissioner's determination the same weight it would
give to a previous trial court ruling, seized upon the fact that the parties
were the same in both adjudications to validate the res judicata defense.
Modern res judicata theory tends to demand this as well prior to successful
invocation of the defense. 12
Bass Foundry did not launch a full-scale application of res judicata
to administrative decisions. Courts began to struggle with the issuenot in terms of the res judicata doctrine itself, but in terms of whether
an administrative decision was attended by the qualities and characteristics
which should give rise to res judicata. In short, was the administrative
decisional process sufficiently court-like to permit the administrative
decisions to become final?
The supreme court itself suggested that the answer was no in Board
of Commissioners, Allen County v. Trautman. 13 When Helen Trautman
thought she had been underpaid as a clerk in the county assessor's
office, she filed a claim with the county board of commissioners. The
board of commissioners disallowecJ the claim for the excess pay but did
regularly pay the semi-monthly claims on the amounts agreed to be due.
Trautman sued for the excess and received judgment in her favor. The
Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, brushing away the county's contention that the commissioners' decision on the claim was res
judicata. The court cited a statute authorizing a claimant either to seek
judicial review or sue independently but did not distinguish between
judicial review of an administrative decision and a collateral attack.
Instead, the court simply stated that the commissioners' decision was

9. Bass Foundry, 141 Ind. at 72, 32 N .E. at 1126 (emphasis in original).
10. ld.
11.

/d.

12. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
13. 204 Ind. 362, 184 N.E. 178 (1933).

4
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"administrative or ministerial and not judiciaL " Presumably, therefore,
the commissioners'
decision
could
not
be
accorded
res
judicata
effect
.
•
In a later, unrelated case, the supreme court provided further explanation for its rationale:
14

[W]hen the Legislature defines its policy and prescribes a standard
as it has in the act in question, it may leave to the executive
boards and officers the determination of facts in order to apply
the law .... An administrative officer charged with the administration of the laws enacted by the General Assembly necessarily
exercises a discretion partaking of the characteristics of the
judicial department of the government, but does not have the
force and effect of a judgment. Unless an administrative officer
or department is permitted to make reasonable rules and regulations, it would be impossible in many instances to apply
and enforce the legislative enactments, and the good to be
accomplished would be entirely lost. 15
.

Apparently, res judicata was occasionally one of the Clffects which an
administrative decision was not accorded.
The court's reluctance to give full-blown effect to decisions stemmed
in part, it seems, not from the procedural requisites necessary for res
judicata to apply, but rather from the alien grounds as a matter of
decisional framework upon which agency decisions are made. The reverse image of this principle is found in the time-honored principle of
deference to agency expertise. For instance, the Indiana Supreme Court
has written:
Where the legislature has created a fact-finding body of experts
in another branch of government, their decision or findings
should not be lightly overridden because we, as judges, might
reach a contrary opinion on the same evidence. So long as the
experts act within the limits of the discretion given them by the
statute, their. decision is final. 16
In other words, the same policy motivating deference to agency expertise
was actually a disincentive to applying res judicata to an agency decision.
The anima mundi for an agency was its expertise in a given field; the
•

14. /d. at 370, 184 N.E. at 181.
15. Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 119-21, 23 N.E.2d 472, 475
(1939) (The Financial Aid Corp . court was reviewing a revised enabling statute of the
Department of Financial Institutions in the face of various constitutional challenges. The
court upheld the act.).
16. Public Serv. Comm'n v. City of Indianapolis, 235 Ind. 70, 79, 131 N .E.2d
308, 311 (1956).

..
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agency was presumably created by the legislature to provide innovative
and problem- or industry. .specific answers to novel, complex issues. The
principles of deciding issues on the narrowest possible factual and legal
basis and adherence to prior decisions lynchpins of the common lawwere not necessarily proper fpr an administrative agency. Without this
decisional framework, courts would not grant the conclusiveness to an
administrative adjudication that was routinely granted to trial court
adjudications. 17 Whether couched as a distinction between judicial and
ministerial functions, as in Trautman, or located in the deference of
courts to agency determinations, courts remained unsure of the proper
"effect" to be given to an agency determination.
This problem, coupled with the issue of which function (either
.executive or legislative) 18 an agency was exercising, caused a continuing
struggle with res judicata questions in the context of the weight to be
given previous administrative adjudications. In the 1970's res judicata's
usefulness in agency decisions received a new test: could res judicata
bind an agency to its own prior decision? A trilogy of zoning cases
from 1970 to 1974 presented three milestones in the field: (a) establishing
res judicata by name as a doctrine to be dealt with in the administrative
context, (b) shifting the focus of the doctrine's applicability to the
procedures attendant to the administrative decisional process, and (c)
suggesting that, when an agency's decision could be termed judicial in
nature, there was no serious impediment to granting that determination
res judicata effect.
The first case was Braughton v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning
Appea/s. 19 There, disappointed landowners sought judicial review of a
zoning variance grant to adjacent landowners. The landowners argued,
inter alia, that the zoning board had previously denied a varianbe petition
for the same property and proposed use. Because there had not been
a showing of any factual difference between the previous and present

17. Agencies are not expected to apply fixed or unyielding rules or policies,
it was argued, but rather to exercise discretion and ingenuity in working out a
satisfactory solution for each new case; and it was concluded that, at least to
the extent that the doctrine of stare decisis ·is founded on the notion that the
law is unchanging, the classical doctrine of stare decisis does not square with
the theory and practices of the agencies.
F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 504 (1962).
18. See Public Service Comm'n, 235 Ind. 70, 131 N.E.2d 308 (1956). In resolving
a standard of review issue, the supreme court pointed out that "rate-making is a l~gislative,
not a judicial function, and even if a statute attempted to lodge such power in a court
it would be unconstitutional." ld. at 81, 131 N.E.2d at 312.
19. 146 Ind. App. 652, 257 N.E.2d 839, reh'g denied, 146 Ind. App. 652, 258
N.E.2d 866 (1970).

6
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variance petitions, the landowners argued; there could be no change in
the board's determination of the issue.
Although not validating the res judicata argument entirely, 20 the
court of appeals wrote that a zoning board ''' should not indiscriminately
or repeatedly reconsider a determination denying a variance absent a
change of conditions or circumstances."21 The burden to raise the issue
and present evidence on it, the court held, fell upon the remonstrators
seeking to show that circumstances indeed had not changed. 22
In Easley v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals, 23 the court of
appeals revisited the burden of proof issue created by Braughton. The
Easley court was faced with the issue of how remonstrators could prove
a change in. circumstances when the reasons for the prior variance de.n ial
were not a matter of public record. To remedy this problem, the court
imposed upon the zoning boards the requirement that, "in all future
cases and in those pending or in which the determination has not become
final, it [tbe board] should specify by factual finding or by a statement
of reasons the basis for denial of the variance petitions." 24
The final case of the trilogy,_decided between Easley and Braughton,
was Board of Zoning Appeals v. Sink. 2s Unlike Easley and Braughton,.
Sink did not involve a quasi-res judicata effect as between two agency
decisions. Instead, the issue· presented in Sink was whether a-retnonstrator
could. use a previous, unappealed trial court· judgment, which reversed
a variance grant, to gain reversal of the board's. granting of a second,
similar petition without following the required procedure for direct judicial review.
Of crucial importance in Sink is the court's statement that "[m]ost
courts have viewed the granting or denying of variance by Boards of
Zoning Appeals as a quasi-judicial determination and have applied the
doctrine of res judicata to their decisions. This is the law in Indiana.' ' 26

20. The court suggested that there were other instances where ''the doctrine of
res judicata is clearly applicable." /d. at 659; 257 N.E.2d at 843; see also id. at 658 n.2,
257 N.E.2d at 842 n.2.
21. ld. at 658, 257 N .E.2d at 842-.
22. /d.
23. 161 Ind. App. 501, 317 N.E.2d 185 (1974) ..
24. Id. at 512, 317 N.E.2d at 192. The court went on to .state: "Thereafter,
remonstrators against subsequent variance petitions may successfully assert a defense in·
the nature of tes Judicata by merely establishing the fact of the prior denial unless the
petitioner proves that there has been a change· in the conditions, circumstances or facts
which induced the prior denial. H /d.
25. 153 Ind. App. 1, 285. N.E.2d 655 (1972).
26. /d. at 8, 285 N.E.2d at 659. The court cited Braughton for the latter proposition;
the c.o urt also cited Beaven v. Village of Palatine, 22 Ill. App. 2d 274, 160 N'. E.2d 702
(1959); Turf Valley Assocs. v. Zoning Bd. of Howard Co., 262 Md. 632, 278 A.2d 574
(1971); In re Clements' Appeal, 2 Ohio App. 2d 201., 207 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
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The court held that the remonstrators could not bypass the administrative
agency (and judicial review of the agency's actions) and assert res judicata
directly before the trial court rendering the first decision. Instead, it
was incumbent upon the remonstrators to establish the elements of the
quasi-res judicata defense, as outlined in Braughton, before the agency
in the first instance. Review of the agency's decision on the res judicata
issue could then be had by normal routes of judicial review. 27
Sink, when read in conjunction with its policy statements concerning
the salutary effects of res judicata, 28 establishes res judicata as a method
of either attacking or defending an agency decision. Sink also suggests
that so long as the decision is quasi-judicial, res judicata must be dealt
with. Braughton and Easley, focusing on how the board may find changed
circumstances and on the precise contours of the change in circumstances
(in the context of zoning) which will justify a different result, evidence
a shift toward ensuring that re-litigation can be had when procedures
are not in place which allow review and understanding of the original
decision. Res judicata effect will not be given to an agency decision
which cannot be explained .or understood. For instance, there must be
a statement of reasons for the denial of the variance under Easley. By
the same token, perhaps, res judicata effect will not be given to an
agency decision which has not followed proper procedure for decisionmaking. In other words, Braughton and Easley may have foreshadowed
a subtle shift toward procedure over deference to the substantive nature
(i.e., expertise) of the agency decision.
•

B.

United States Supreme Court History

The seminal case in United States Supreme Court pronouncements
is relatively recent. In 1966, the decision in United States v. Utah
Construction & Mining Co. 29 explicitly validated for the first time granting
administrative decisions res judicata effect. In Utah Construction, the
issue was, in its simplest form, whether the decision of the Advisory
Board of Contract Appeals was entitled to res judicata effect in a
subsequent suit in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims ordered

27. Sink, 153 Ind. App. at 8, 285 N.E.2d at 659.
28. The court noted that the bar on re-litigation of disputes formerly decided is
a matter of public policy, and is based upon economies of time and fairness to parties.
/d. at 7, 285 N .E.2d at 658-59. The Sink court's statements must be limited to the context
of that case: whether res judicata effect for a trial court-not agency-decision could
effectively short-circuit the administrative review process. Nonetheless, given the positive
statement by the court that res judicata would apply to agency quasi-judicial determinations,
there can be little doubt that the same benefits which obtain from res judicata in a court
would also, in the Sink court's view, apply to an agency decision.
29. 384 u.s. 394 (1966).
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that the contractor's delay claims (for contract price adjustment and
time extension) be heard in a trial de novo, rather than based solely
upon the administrative record before the Advisory Board of Contract
Appeals. 30
The Supreme Court's holding was ostensibly based on the Wunderlich
Act of 1954, which required that decisions of the agency should b~
final, absent extreme circumstances. 31 The Supreme Court went beyond
this, however, to reach the general res judicata32 issue as developed by
common law. The Court boldly stated:
Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that res
judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings,
but such language is certainly too broad. When an administrative
agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues
of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply
res judicata to enforce repose. 33
This declaration seems at odds with the authority cited but appears to
have been intentionally created for future application to cases where the
issue was more directly presented.
Professor Davis suggests that the statement was by no means mere
obiter dictum. Instead, he writes, "The statement was carefully crafted.
Each detail has significance. " 34 Review of the primary authority of the
Utah Construction Court, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 35
bears this premise out. Sunshine Anthracite petitioned the National
Bituminous Coal Commission for a determination that its coal was not
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. The petition was denied; Sunshine then unsuccessfully sought judicial review of the commission's
decision. Later, the Internal Revenue Service sought to collect taxes based
on the fact that Sunshine actually produced bituminous coal. In the
Supreme Court's opinion, res judicata effect was given to the court

30.

Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 606, 609-10 (Ct. Cl.

1964).
31. The statute provided that "any such decision shall be final and conclusive
unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as
necessarily to imply bad faith or is not supported by substantial evidence." 384 U.S. at
399 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964)).
32. The precise issue before the Court was one of collateral estoppel: whether the
factual findings of the board were conclusive in the subsequent litigation of the alleged
breach of contract. Utah Constr. , 384 U.S. at 400. For convenience, the discussion herein
is of res judicata generally.
33. /d. at 421-22.
34. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21:2, at 49 (1983).
381 (1940).
35. 310

u.s.
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decision which reviewed the Bituminous Coal Commission decision, 36 not
the Bituminous Coal Com.m ission decision itself.
The distinction may at first appear to be· of little significance. Yet
the previous court judgment allowed the Sunshine Anthracite Court to
speak in terms of res judicata with little difficulty. The Court spoke in
terms of "a judgment" rendered in "each of these two suits." In the
Court~s view, this made the key issue "whether or not in the earlier
litigation the representative of the United States had [the] authority to
represent its interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy.' ; 37
Consequently, the Court found unassailable the Coal Commission's authority to decide the matter and then enter the subsequent litigation.
With those two conclusions reached, the ultimate conclusion was clear:
the court decision, affirming the Bituminous Coal Commission, bound
both the commission and the Internal Revenue Service because a judicial
decision which binds the United States binds all its agencies . 38
The decision in Sunshine Anthracite is, in this light, much removed
from the Utah Construction decision. Utah Construction involved making
final an agency decision in a subsequent court case; Sunshine Anthracite
was effectively a case of one court judgment being given preclusive
effect in a subsequent court case. Professor Davis continues with his
evaluation of Utah Construction:
The only part of the statement that is subject to doubt is that
"the courts have not hesitated., ... " It should be interpreted
to mean that the Supreme Court did not hesitate in the Utah
Construction case, for the Supreme Court before that case did
a good deal of hesitating. 39
It is, then, appropriate to take the Utah Construction Court's statement in smaller pieces. The pre-requisites to giving res_ judicata effect
to an agency decision are four-fold. 40 First, the agency must be acting
in judicial capacity. Legislative actions by the agency, such as rulemaking,
do not fall within the limits of the administrative res judicata doctrine.
So, too, may decisions which require agency expertise and are perhaps
not attended by trial-type procedures.
Second, the agency must be resolving disputed issues of fact. At
first blush, the requirement seems to be derivative of the first, because
determination of the historical facts (to which the law is then applied)
seems at the core of the judicial function. However, the statement may

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 403-04.
ld~ at 403.
/d.
K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 21:2, at 49.
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co.t 384 U.S. 394 (1966).

'
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be less innocuous than it seems. The effect to be given to an agency
decision may extend only to the brute, cold, historical facts the actual
events which transpired. Evaluative facts, those shading more toward
legal conclusions, along with the legal conclusions, may not be subject
to a res judicata effect. The distinction between giving res judicata effect
to fact findings but not legal conclusions may separate administrative
41
res judicata from the court-oriented res judicata.
Thirdly, the fact issues must have been ''properly before'' the administrative agency. Apparently, jurisdictional defects at the agency level,
and perhaps even procedural, non-fundamental defects in the agency's
decisional process will prevent using the agency decision in subsequent
litigation. The Utah Construction Court noted that if an agency gratuitously made findings on an issue, even an issue over which it had
jurisdiction, ''such findings would have no finality whatsoever.' ' 42 Consequently, an agency decision, even if all the remaining prerequisites are
met, still may not be entitled to preclusive effect. A search for procedural
defects lurking behind the administrative record, as well as the scope
of the issues actually litigated, is necessary for a determination of whether
an agency decision is actually the final determination of the issue.
Fourth, the parties before the agency must "have had an adequate
43
opportunity to litigate'' the disputed issues of fact. Actual utilization
of the opportunity need not be afforded. Nevertheless, the issue does
not end there. Requisites for procedural due process certainly figure in
the calculus, as does the nature of the administrative state, where many
dispositions are made without hearing, without the presence of the
affected party, and probably without the presence of counsel.
Obviously, superimposing additional prerequisites to use of res judicata for agency decisions is designed to promote some control over
subsequent use of administrative decisions while at the same time encouraging ''the parties to make a complete disclosure at the administrative
level, rather than holding evidence back for subsequent litigation.' ' 44
This background sets the stage for understanding and analyzing the
Indiana Supreme Court's decision in McClanahan v. Remington Freight
Lines, Inc. 45

McCLANAHAN CAs~
John McClanahan drove a truck for Remington Freight Lines, Inc.,
an Indiana company. McClanahan, who started work in November 1981,
III.

41.
supra note
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

THE

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDOMENTS § 27 (1982). See a/so K. DAVIS,

34, at 51.
Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 419 n.l5.
!d. at 422.
Id. at 420.
517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988).

•

The facts in this section are taken from the Court of Appeals decision, 498
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had no contract of employment. McClanahan was travelling from New
York to Minnesota, carrying a load that weighed 78,000 pounds. Federal
law allowed 80,000 pound loads; Illinois allowed only 75,000 pound
loads. Before reaching Illinois, McClanahan called the safety director
for Remington, Richard Barbour, and told him that the load was too
heavy.
Barbour told McClanahan that the company would pay any fine he
would not be caught in any event .
incurred and that he probably
.
McClanahan continuously refused to drive through Illinois. McClanahan
drove back to Remington's terminal, on orders from Remington. When
he returned, McClanahan was fired; Remington's employee manual defined his termination as a ''voluntary quit.''
McClanahan applied for unemployment benefits. The initial application was refused, without hearing. McClanahan pursued an appeal to
the Indiana Employment Security Division's Appellate Section. A hearing
was held at. which McClanahan and Barbour both testified. The hearing
officer reversed the initial determination, holding that McClanahan was
not discharged for just cause. He was therefore entitled, the· hearing
officer held, to unemployment compensation. No appeal was taken to
the Indiana Employment Security Division's full board from the hearing
officer's order.
Having secured his unemployment compensation benefits, McClanahan then instituted a separate action against Remington and. Barbour
in the Tippecanoe County Superior Court. He alleged retaliatory and
wrongful discharge. Both McClanahan and Remington moved for summary judgment. McClanahan argued that re-litigation of the reasons for
his discharge was not permitted: the decision of the hearing officer was
collateral estoppel in the court case as to the facts causing his discharge.
Remington sought summary judgment on the ultimate merits of the case:
McClanahan was an employee at will and could be terminated for any
(or no) reason and hence had no cause of action. The trial court granted
Remington's motion and denied McClanahan's.
The Second District of the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the
grant of summary judgment in Remington's favor, and affirmed the
denial of McClanahan's motion. On the first issue, the court held that
"if, as Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. clearly holds, an employee
cannot be discharged solely for exercising a statutory right, logic and
justice compel us to hold that an employee can.not be discharged solely
for refusing to breach a statutorily imposed duty.' ' 47
•

N.E.2d 1336 (Ind. Ct. App. l986), and the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion on transfer,
517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988).
47. 517 N .E.2d at 392 (quoting Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249,
297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)).

•
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On the second issue, whether the reasons for McClanahan's discharge
were relitigable, the court held that McClanahan had not presented a
sufficient evidentiary basis for the imposition of collateral estoppel. The
decision of the appeals referee (hearing officer) was not certified and
could not be properly considered by the trial judge in determining the
summary judgment motion. The appeals court found that the transcript
of the proceedings before the hearing officer did not contain the hearing
officer's decision and was thus an insufficient basis upon which to base
a summary judgment ruling.
However, the court chose to address the general collateral estoppel
issue because of its likely recurrence on remand. The court concluded
that the decisions of the Indiana Employment Security Division could
be given res judicata effect. Acknowledging the procedures for notice,
evidentiary record, oaths, and subpoenas in the appeals referee hearing,
the court determined that the proceedings were judicial in nature, particularly in view of the appeals referee's authority to affirm, modify or
reverse the previous determination.
In a footnote, the court suggested some instances in which the agency
.decision was not to be accorded collateral estoppel or res judicata effect. 48
Noting that collateral estoppel effect is not proper when convincing
reasons are advanced why the agency decision should not be final, the
court of appeals suggested a total failure to observe procedural safeguards
or a consideration of inadmissible evidence might be such a convincing
reason. Nevertheless, the court held that, the appeals referee's decision,
upon a proper evidentiary foundation, was entitled to collateral estoppel
effect in this case.
The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer. 49 The court affirmed
the lower court's holding that McClanahan had stated a valid cause of
action. The court also addressed the collateral estoppel issue because of
its likely recurrence. Unlike the court of appeals, the Indiana Supreme
Court declined to give the appeals referee's decision collateral estoppel
effect. The high court adopted the following analysis for the issue: "1)
whether the issues sought to be estopped were within the statutory
jurisdiction of the agency; 2) whether the agency was acting in a judicial
capacity; 3) whether both parties had a fair opportunity to litigate the
issues; [and] 4) whether the decision of the administrative tribunal could
be appealed to a judicial tribunal. " 50 The application of this analysis
of the facts before the court is critical to an informed understanding
of McClanahan ,s effect on later cases involving collateral estoppel and
administrative decisions.
48.
49.
50.

498 N.E.2d at 1343 n.S.
517 N.E.2d at 391.
/d. at· 394.

1988]
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ANALYSIS OF McCLANAHAN

The first and foremost task in analyzing McClanahan is to examine
its underlying rationale and determine whether there is any basis in law
for the result reached by the supreme court. Besides the two Indiana
cases cited in the opinion, South Bend Federation of Teachers v. National
Education Association51 and Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Association,
Inc. ,52 the primary basis for the court's result was engendered by the
federal district court case of Gear v. City of Des Moines. 53 In that case,
where the factual situation 54 was very similar to that present in McClanahan, the trial court set forth four elements which must be fulfilled
by a prior administrative decision before its collateral application to a
related civil rights claim. The Indiana Supreme Court faithfully reproduced those elements in its own inquiry into McClanahan's case: (1) the
matters at issue must be within the agency's statutory jurisdiction; (2)
the agency had to function judicially; (3) both parties had to have a
fair opportunity to litigate the issues; (4) the administrative decision
must be appealable. 55 The Gear court found the Iowa Job Service's
decision worthy of collateral estoppel effect; the Indiana Supreme Court
applied these same four factors to the decision of the Indiana Employment
Security Division and found it wanting.
This result is difficult to justify because the Iowa agency's procedures
were almost identical to the Indiana agency's, even to the extent that
there is no trial de novo on disputed issues of fact. This result is also
difficult to justify because of the four elements themselves. There is one
statement in Gear, however, which is particularly illuminating and clearly
justifies the decision rendered by the Indiana court: ''Additional related
factors which must figure in the court's analysis include the deference
accorded opinions of a particular administrative entity by the state courts,
the intention of that entity and the expectations of the parties regarding
judicial retrial of factual questions determined in administrative proceedings. '' 56 Although not specifically endorsed by the McClanahan court,

51. 180 Ind. App. 299, 389 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
52. 441 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
53. 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
54. In Gear, a female former police officer was denied unemployment compensation
upon a factual finding that she had left her employment voluntarily and without good
cause. In her later lawsuit for relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution, the defendants attempted to erect the Iowa
Department of Job Service's finding as collateral estoppel to further litigation of the facts
dispositive of her civil rights action. On the basis of the procedures before the Department,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on the matter of collateral estoppel. /d.
55. 517 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 1988).
56. 514 F. Supp. at 1221.
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it is very apparent that these considerations weighed more heavily in its
decision than the enumerated criteria. Thus, the court could freely state
that, despite the obvious opportunity for review as required by the fourth
factor, it considered instead the fact that it was ''altogether likely that
Remington would have pursued the appeal had it known McClanahan's
intent to file a civil action for substantial damages. " 57 How else to
explain the cavalier treatment of the administrative procedures, procedures
which are, by law, required to be informal in order to relieve the burden
on trial courts? The McClanahan court obviously rendered only lipservice to the factors listed by the Gear court and instead determined
that the defendants had neither a full nor fair opportunity to litigate
the factual issue before the division on the premise that to decide
otherwise would be inequitable because they had not taken full and fair
advantage of the opportunity actually offered them. As critical as that
statement may seem, it is not altogether clear that the McClanahan court
did not reach the correct result in any event, regardless of its failure
to acknowledge the Gear elements.
One must first re-examine the substance of the elements the Gear
opinion posited for application of collateral estoppel in the agencyjudiciary context. (These four factors are not to be confused with the
four integral parts of the essential collateral estoppel inquiry itself.) 58
Primarily, a court is to look at the nature of the proceeding, the due
process offered the parties (opportunity to litigate and opportunity for
review), and the agency's jurisdiction over the issue in question. The
standard for application of these factors is tempered ''selectively and
with a greater degree of flexibility' 'S 9 than is afforded the traditional
application of res judicata of judicial decisions. The problem with this
approach on collateral review of agency decisions is that it is directly
contrary to the well-established standard of judicial review of agency
decisions on direct review.
It is well-settled by both statute and case law that on direct appeal
from an administrative decision, a court has only limited review of that
decision. However, it is interesting that the criteria governing that review
bear a more than coincidental resemblance to the Gear factors. By
statute, an Indiana court may grant relief from an agency decision only
'

57. 517 N.E.2d at 395 (emphasis added).
58. There are four basic elements of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must
have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the matter now in issue was,
or might have been, determined in the former suit; (3) the particular controversy previously
adjudicated must have been between the parties to the present suit or their privies; and
(4) the judgment in the former suit must have been rendered on the merits. Cox v. Indiana
Subcontractors Ass'n, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 222, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
59. Gear, 514 F. Supp. at 1221.
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if its action is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence.60 The common law ingredients, for those agencies not governed
by the Administrative Adjudication Act, 61 are the same.62 Distilled to
their essence, the direct review criteria are almost the same as those set
forth in Gear: Did the agency have jurisdiction? Did the agency afford
the aggrieved party due process? Was the decision void for any reason
supplied by the law? It is apparent there is very little to distinguish the
items a court considers on direct review of an administrative adjudication
from those used in Gear and McClanahan in determining whether to
allow its collateral use except the actual application of those factors.
The critical difference between the two applications is that on direct
review., courts are inclined to give much greater deference to the decision
of the agency63 than the supreme court did in the McClanahan case. In
other words, on direct appeal, an agency determination is more likely
to be upheld on the very same notions that make it unlikely it will be
given effect in a collateral matter. Therefore, a party stands a much
greater chance of being bound by such a decision if he takes the matter
directly for review than if he opts to take his chances in a different
proceeding involving the same issues before the agency. The McClanahan
opinion, if nothing else, gives an aggrieved party another opportunity
to relitigate the issues and to succeed on the merits, when the agency
decision has been otherwise unfavorable. On collateral matters, the agency
decision is less likely to prohibit the trial court from retrying the very
same case whereas de novo relief is not typically available in judicial
review. 64
This lack of symmetry in the application of the same factors to the
same sort of decision but with different results is troublesome. There
appear to be three solutions to this problem. One could dispense with

60. IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (1988).
61. IND. CODE §§ 4-21.5-1-1 to -2-4 (1988).
62. See, e.g., Tilton v. Southwest School Corp., 151 Ind. App. 608, 281 N.E.2d
117 (1972).
63. See e.g., New Trend Beauty School, Inc. v. Indiana State Bd. of Beauty
Culturist Examiners, 518 N.E.2d 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Drake v. City of Gary, 449
N.E.2d 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
64. IND. CoDE § 4-21.5-5-11 (1988) sets forth the following limitation on the
introduction of evidence upon judicial review of an administrative decision: "Judicial
review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for the agency
action supplemented by additional evidence taken under section 12 of this chapter. The
court may not try the cause de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
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the Gear criteria altogether .in matters of collateral attack and consider
only the four basic elements of collateral estoppel itself. The McClanahan
court obviously followed this course. Or one could apply the· factors in
matters of collateral attack in the same fashion they are treated on direct
judicial review. Lastly, one could formulate a different set of criteria
than those· set forth by the Gear and McClanahan decisions.
With the first solution, a trial court would simply apply the four
basic elements of collateral estoppel65 but would also determine whether
the agency's decision was sufficiently congruent with trial proceedings
to grant it the deference due to judicial decisions. This format, for
which there is already established precedent in McClanahan, has a practical appeal to it. Unless the parties' expectations evince otherwise, it
could be presumed that they did not .g rant sufficient weight to the
informal proceedings before the administrative agency to make them be
bound by its decisions in a collateral judicial matter that may very well
have greater ramifications. For instance, McClanahan's claim for unemployment compensation, garnering as it did only a minimal economic
award, could not have presaged to his employer that a larger wrongful
discharge suit lurked in the wings. Therefore, as is their wont, the parties
probably took the entire proceedings before the Employment Security
Division much more lightly, given the informality and routine nature
of the proceedings. On the other hand, a matter before the Medical
Licensing Board has a greater potential for grave consequences and for
greater care and preparation by the parties. A decision by the Licensing
Board is more likely to deprive a party of property and liberty rights
to which specific due process protections inhere .. Therefore,. that agency
is more likely,_ as a matter of course, to conduct traditional judicial
proceedings although perhaps somewhat more informally as allowed by
statute. Under the McClanahan rationale, which is dependent upon
whether the hearing ''differed substantially from a traditional courtroom
proceeding,''66 greater credence would therefore be given a Board decision
than the one at issue in McClanahan and collateral estoppel principles
more likely effected.
This result may appear to be in derogation of the whole purpose
for creating agencies in the first place to delegate certain judicial responsibilities to governmental entities with expertise in specific areas of
the law. McClanahan might be read to suggest such a ''cavalier'' result
inasmuch as some agency decisions could fall by the wayside upon
collateral attack because their proceedings are not conducted as if in a
courtroom, nor were they conceived to be. However, the likelihood of

65.
66.

See, e.g.~ Hardesty v. Bolerjack, 441 N .E.2d 243, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
517 N .E.2d at 394-95.
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any great number of decisions reaching the posture present in McClanahan
seems very remote there are only two S\lCh scenarios in contemporary
Indiana case law, McClanahan and Cox. 67 In addition, it is not unlikely
that the expectations of the parties could be better served by a "retrial"
on the merits. Otherwise, agency decisions may end up as formalistic
as judicial proceedings in order to forestall unexpected collateral attacks,
an outcome not contemplated when the delegation of judicial duties was
imposed upon agencies . The McClanahan opinion may therefore be more
in line with current attitudes regarding collateral review of agency decisions than its lack of reliance on Gear might imply.
The second alternative would be to apply the already established
direct review criteria as pronounced by Gear uniformly to both direct
attacks on administrative decisions, via judicial review, and collateral
attacks. The simplicity in applying this standard is apparent when one
contemplates the wealth of case law from which the courts could draw
in the context of judicial review. In addition, applying the Gear standard
would accord to agency decisions the dignity to which they are entitled
by reason of their fact-finding function . This posture, of course, would
make McClanahan and Cox incorrectly resolved.
The primary motivation for wielding an agency decision as a weapon
in a judicial collateral attack, be it offensively or defensively, is to
expedite proceedings. If a fact at issue has been already determined
before a trier of fact, i.e., the administrative agency, there seems no
reasonable need to retry the matter before yet another trier of fact.
And this is the crucial point that the Cox and McClanahan courts
appeared to miss. The only branch of res judicata amenable for use in
the administrative context is issue preclusion/collateral estoppel. Estoppel
by judgment is out of the question for the very reason that agencies
were established they dispense specialized remedies not available to trial
courts. There could be no estoppel between the judgment of a trial
court and the decision of an agency. That therefore leaves, by default,
collateral estoppel as the res judicata tool used by trial courts when
confronted with the resolution of the same or similar issues by an agency.
The Cox court evinced no understanding of this tenet when it
challenged the agency's expertise to decide contract issues. That expertise
is beside the point because that was never the "issue" before the
Employment Security Division. Rather, the Division determined that Cox
had been terminated for just cause by his employer. When his employer
attempted to use the fact of his statutorily lawful termination in Cox's
breach of contract action, such fact was apparently to be used simply
as one established element among many in the civil litigation. There is

67.

Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Ass'n, 441 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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no intimation from the case's presentation of the facts that Cox's proper
termination was ipso facto a determination of his contract claim. Rather,
the agency's finding of fact might have been used in the Association's
defense of Cox's claim-· to justify the employer's alleged breach if indeed
such breach existed at all. In any event, it is clear the Cox case misunderstood the use of the agency's finding and misunderstood the basic
concept of collateral attack in the agency-judiciary context.
The court in Shortridge v. Review Board of Indiana Employment
Security Division, 68 however, was right on target when it held that an
agency's findings of fact are binding on collateral attack. This principle
is what some courts seem to lose sight of when they encourage giving
less deference to agency decisions than to judicial decisions. The only
application for agency determinations in court cases is in the matter of
fact-finding. Fact-finding is not a specialized area reserved for the expertise of trial courts. Indeed, it is the basic function of agencies to
render certain specialized remedies. Nevertheless, underlying those remedies are factual determinations. In fact, administrative agencies are
typically required to consider three types of facts: evidentiary facts which
form the foundation for their basic findings of fact upon which they
determine their ultimate findings of fact (remedies).69 Given the burden
that agencies must bear with regard ~o the factual conclusions they must
draw, 70 particularly for purposes of judicial review and despite the
informalities inhering in their procedures, there seems no reason why
their factual determinations should be given any less credence than a
trial court's in the matter of collateral estoppel. A trier·of-fact is a trierof-fact is a trier-of-fact. There is simply no rational explanation for not
honoring that role in the determination of the credibility of witnesses
and weighing of evidence for purposes of establishing factual matters
on collateral attack. As discussed above, it is expected from the agencies
as a matter of law on direct attack by judicial review. And courts give
deference to it. As a consequence, there also seems no rational reason
why the Gear criteria cannot be applied with the force used in judicial
review when a court is confronted with an agency decision on collateral
attack.
As a third alternative, one could formulate a different set of rules.
In light of the conclusions regarding the other two alternatives, that
•

68. 498 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
69. See, e.g., Perez v. United States Steel Corp., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ind. 1981)
(''[F) in dings of basic fact must reveal the Board's analysis of the evidence and its
determination therefrom regarding the various specific issues of fact which bear on the
particular claim. The 'finding of ultimate fact' is the ultimate factual conclusion regarding
the particular claim before the Board.'').
70. /d.
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would hardly seem a useful exercise. The embryo for the notion that
administrative res judicata even needed an independent s·et of rules was
formed in Professor Davis' well-recognized treatise on administrative
law. 71 Professor Davis' premise was that administrative agencies often
work with fluid facts and shifting policies. 72 How an agency's function
in this regard differs significantly from that of a trial court is difficult
to discern, but evidently Davis was concerned more with the agencyagency decisions rather than agency-judiciary matters. Agencies, being
creatures of politics, are often governed by the vagaries of patronage
in each administration resulting in new board memberships, and consequently, new agendas. Regardless, a set of rules would be useful, if
focused on the proper goal, in order to confront more objectively other
situations such as that which arose in McClanahan.
A framework for formulating a set of rules in the collateral use of
agency decisions in a later lawsuit should adopt portions of the first
two solutions discussed above but as a disinct permutation entire unto
itself. Actually, the McClanahan court contributed to such a set of rules,
albeit perhaps unwittingly. The first element is that which sets agencies
apart from judicial tribunals in the first instance the identification of
the agency function. (1) Did the agency act in a judicial capacity (as
opposed to its legislative capacity)? Once that is determined in the
affirmative, the trial court simply applies the remaining three nonjurisdictional elements of collateral estoppel: (2) Did the agency decision
involve and bind the same parties or their privies? (3) Was the agency
decision final, i.e., unreviewed? (4) Was the issue at hand actually
"litigated" and essential to the agency's decision? 73 The rules look
familiar; however, the first step which sets agency decisions apart from
trial court judgments has its own considerations.
Whether the agency acted in a judicial capacity is not an inquiry
that goes deep enough. It was not even an inquiry that the McClanahan
court took at face value. Although McClanahan and his employer took
part in a judicial proceeding, it was simply not "judicial" enough. In
reaching that conclusion, the supreme court looked at the parties' expectations and the actual occurrence of events before the agency. That
approach is not entirely bad because the right result was reached in the
McClanahan decision. However, the subjective element .of the parties'
expectations is simply too uncertain to use as an appropriate element
of the judicial nature of an agency proceedings.
Rather, the emphasis on the judicial capacity of the agency should
center on an objective inquiry as to what actually happened before the
71.
72.
73.

DAVIS,

supra note 34, at §§ 18.01, 18.04.

/d.

McClanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 394.
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agency and on whether those events comport with our notions of a
judicial function. Those investigations must take into account the legislatively mandated informality of such proceedings, and the measure
of that informality would also have a direct relationship to the parties'
expectations. Hence, the elimination of one of McClanahan's questions
is the elimination of an ill-defined yardstick. What the trial court should
be limited to is a review of the agency record and that record alone.
From the information thereint the court could .d etermine (1). the
adversarial nature of the proceedingst i.e., did the parties actually litigate
the issues in the case or was the issue so small that it was considered
a fait accompli upon the presentation of the petitioner's case? Did the
hearing examiner assist petitioner in the presentation of his case?; and
(2) the due process accorded the parties, i.e., how strictly did the hearing
examiner adhere to the rules of evidence? Was cross-examination available? Was testimony under oath?
·
These two concerns were primary factors in the McClanahan decision
74
and correctly so. However, taking out the subjective elements of that
opinion and limiting the trial court's assessment of the agency's judicial
function to the actual record before it will confine the inquiry to the
objective nature of the elements rather than making collateral estoppel
decisions subject to the varying strengths of the parties' arguments
dependent upon "if only I had known the consequences." Once this
objective hurdle is crossed, the trial court then either denies estoppel
effect to the decision outright or goes on to consider the remaining
collateral estoppel elements. Simplistic by nature, these rules need not
be anymore complicated. To do so would merely, and unnecessarily,
obfuscate a doctrine which has enjoyed unparalleled success between
trial court opinions without such subjective confusion.
V.

APPLICATION OF McCLANAHAN
.

After having engaged in extensive analysis of McClanahan 7 s and
addre·ssing its immediate ramifications vis a vis its actual application to
cases of the same ilk, one must consider the effects, if any, this case
will have on the whole broad spectrum of the matter of the res judicata
effect to be given to administrative decisions in the judicial arena. Such
an investigation entails consideration of other "current" Indiana cases,
such as South Bend Federation of Teachers v. National Education
Association76 and Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Association, Inc. ,'7 as

74.
75.
76.
77.

See id. at 395.
517 N.E.2d 390 .... (Ind. 1988) .
180 Ind. App. 299, 389 N.E.2d 23 (1979).
441 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1.982).
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well as of the manner in which the issue is presented to a court for
review. Primarily, the distinction is whether a trial court is applying the
doctrine between two decisions of the same agency or between an agency
decision and a trial court proceeding. Indiana case law suggests that
distinction makes a difference.
South Bend Federation of Teachers is more akin to the zoning cases
78
discussed previously because it consisted of the application of an agency
decision to a later decision of the same agency. In the South Bend case,
the matter was brought to a head in a judicial challenge to a decision
of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board (IEERB). One
teachers' association (NEA) filed a Verified Complaint to enjoin IEERB
from exercising jurisdiction over an election petition filed by a rival
association (AFT). The basis for the: complaint was a decision entered
on March 25, 1977. The thrust of the complaint was that IEERB- was
bound to apply an earlier 1974 board decision in favor of NEA, rather
than be allowed to issue a second decision in favor of AFT. In a wellreasoned opinion, presaging Gear v. City of Des Moines, 79 Judge Buchanan determined that no facts had intervened between the two IEERB
decisions necessitating a change in position from the 1974 ruling, and
the parties, as. well as IEERB, were bound by the earlier declarations
regarding the same factual determination material to both decisions 80the interpretation of an election agreement among the two associations
and the s_chool corporation. 81
As with McClanahan, the court of appeals was confronted with a
factual issue, thereby requiring the application of the collateral ·estoppel
branch of res judicata, but with the twist that the factual determination
was binding on the agency rather than upon a trial court. The trial
court's function here was one more of review rather than of a de novo
litigation of a distinct cause of action. Despite the ultimate holding in
McClanahan, there is nothing to intimate that South Bend Federation
of Teachers is defunct precedent, at least in the agency-agency context.
The second important case addressed by McClanahan is Cox v.
Indiana Subcontractors Association, Inc. 82 The factual issues in the Cox
case are very similar to those presented in McClanahan: Cox filed a
claim for unemployment compensation before the Employment Security
Division after he was terminated from his positions as director and
board secretary for the Indiana Subcontractors Association. 83 The Di-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
180 Ind. App. at 318, 389 N.E.2d at 34.
Id. at 301, 389 N.E.2d at 25.
441 N .E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 224.
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vision denied him benefits upon its determination that he had been
terminated for just cause. 84 Cox then filed a suit against the Association
for, among other things, breach of contract. In turn, the Association
erected the Division's finding as res judicata on the issue. Like the
McClanahan court, the Cox court examined the newly rendered opinion
of Gear v. City of Des Moinesss and, like the McClanahan court, held
that res judicata was not applicable. The court of appeals held the
doctrine inappropriate in this instance because "'[it] is simply inapplicable
to resolve a case as complex as the present one.'' 86 Cox and McClanahan
are therefore congruent in result where they both reflect a disinclination
to give deference to agency decisions in matters of judicial cognizance,.
However, the Cox result is disturbing because of its lack of rationale.
The most troubling aspect of the Cox decision is the utter lack of
analysis of the Gear decision as it should have been applied to the
matter at hand. There is no disputing that Cox probably set forth the.
appropriate standards of review as delineated in Gear in a more comprehensive fashion than did McClanahan. Unfortunately, such coverage
does not explain the total lack of application of the Gear elements to
the Cox facts. Rather, the court made the sweeping generalization that
q[t]he Review Board [of the Employment Security Division] is not the
proper authority to determine complex legal issues involving contract
88
87
interpretation and tort issues. " Even if that proposition were true,
this declaration totally ignores the well-developed meaning of the· collateral estoppel prong of res judicata: ''when a particular issue is adjudicated and then is put into issue in a subsequent suit on a different
cause of action between the same· parties or those in privity with them. '' 89
Instead, the Cox court determined that a legal opinion rendered by the
Division could not prevent relitig_ation of the same question in court.
The problem is that collateral estoppel is a fact-based principle rather
than a law-based. The Division had made no contractual determination,
only a determination of the reasons for Cox's termination, which fact
would have been an essential element in the Association's defense of
the breach of contract claim. In other words, the reliability of the Cox

84. ld.
85. 514 F~ Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
86. Cox, 441 N.E.2d at 226.
87. /d. at 226.
88. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dev. Comm 'n v. I. Ching, Inc., 460 N .E.2d 1236,
1237 (Ind. Ct. App. t984) ("It is ... well settled that landowners seeking to raise the
issue of [confiscation of property without just compensation] must exhaust their administrative remedies by presenting the constitutional issue to the Board of Zoning Appeals
before invoking the aid of the courts.").
89~ South Bend Fed'n of Teachers v. National Educ. Ass'n, 180 Ind. App. 299,
314, 389 N.E.2d 23, 32 (1979).
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decision, as applied to the facts before it, is of questionable value
although there is without doubt important ramifications for its use as
a source of the law to apply when other significant cases arise dealing
with the application of res judicata in the administrative-judicial context.
There also exists one other Indiana decision of a contemporary
nature which is noteworthy, if for no other reason than that it sheds
some additional light on our courts' willingness to apply the doctrine
of res judicata with regard to agency decisions when the opportunity
presents itself. In Shortridge v. Review Board of Indiana Employment
Security Division, 90 collateral estoppel was utilized to require the Employment Security Division to abide by its own findings of fact rendered
in 1977 when determining benefits to be awarded to the same claimant
in 1984 proceedings. 91 The agency-agency application of res judicata was
born of an analysis of South Bend Federation of Teachers. 92 However,
what is interesting about this opinion is its divergence from the Cox
case in its definitive reliance upon the collateral estoppel doctrine as
applicable to findings of fact, and not just to the determination of
singular legal questions as applied to those facts.
If one can say with any authority that there is a "pattern" to the
manner in which Indiana courts will consider the doctrine of res judicata
in giving estoppel effect to agency decisions, the likelihood of success
is greater when the issue arises in the agency-agency relationship, as in
South Bend Federation of Teachers and Shortridge. The ·philosophy
inhering in those two cases is, succinctly, "if there is a reason to settle
93
the issues involved once and for all,' ' courts will not be loathe to
apply estoppel-type principles to "guard parties against vexatious and
repetitious litigation of issues which have been determined in a judicial
or quasi-judicial proceeding.' ' 94 Both opinions evince little or no patience
for an agency's decision to reverse itself in subsequent proceedings where
the legal questions and/or facts at issue remain essentially the same and
where intervening events have not changed the circumstances upon which
the initial findings were based. 95 Such philosophy, however, has not been
translated into the agency-judiciary situation, where the courts seem more

90. 498 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). See also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
91. /d. at 91.
92. 180 Ind. App. 299, 389 N.E.2d 23 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes
78-81.
93. South Bend Fed'n of Teachers, 180 Ind. App. at 317, 389 N .E.2d at 34.
94. 180 Ind. App. at 318, 389 N.E.2d at 35; see also Shortridge, 498 N.E.2d at
90.
95. South Bend Fed,n of Teachers, 180 Ind. App. at 317, 389 N.E.2d at 34;
Shortridge, 498 N .E.2d at 90.
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reluctant to afford agency decisions the respect sufficient to estop later
judicial determinations.
This attitude is best exemplified in Cox. 96 The deference ordinarily
given by courts to administrative decisions and agency expertise97 fell
by the wayside when the court of appeals declared, "[t]he Review Board
lacks the requisite training and experience to determine these matters." 98
That statement calls into question the manner in which an agency makes
its factual determinations, especially because there seems to be no disputebut that collateral estoppel/issue preclusion, rather than estoppel by
judgment, will be the manner of applying an administrative decision to
a judicial cause of action. And the supreme court dealt handily with
this very attitude toward such fact-finding expertise in McClanahan:
[N]either Remington nor Barbour had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate- the issue of whether McClanahan was discharged for
refusing to commit an illegal act .... [T]he nature of the administrative hearing itself differed substantially from a traditional
courtroom proceeding. The referee acted as the primary questioner, and neither party was represented by counsel. Crossexamination was minimal and ineffective. Inasmuch as the rules
of evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings,
a substantial amount of hearsay potentially inadmissible at trial
was introduced without objection.
• • *

In light of all these circumstances, fairness requires that we
not apply collateral estoppel. The relative informality of the
particular administrative procedure at issue here does not meet
the test used in Cox. It is a procedure designed for quick and
inexpensive determinations. of unemployment benefits. 99
In essence, the supreme court implies that when an agency decision is
brought for estoppel consideration before a court, its proceedings must
be as nearly as akin to a judicial atmosphere as possible or its decisions
will not merit application in a court of law. By the supreme court's
very declaration that an agency's decision is specifically designed for
qquick and inexpensive determinations''' and by reason of the typically
relaxed evidentiary and procedural requirements allowed in administrative

See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
·
97. See, e.g., Capital Improvem-ent Bd. of Managers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 176

96.

Ind. App. 240, 259, 375
of an administrative body
of the agency, but rather
98. 441 N .E.2d at
99. 517 N.E.2d at

N .E.2d 616, 630 (1978) (''[A court] in reviewing the decision
is not to substitute its own opinions and conclusions for those
must give deference to the expertise of that agency.").
226.

394-95.
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proceedings, 100 it is unlikely that administrative decisions will ever become
an integral part of the collateral estoppel doctrine in Indiana within the
judicial arena, despite the representations to the contrary in McClanahan
v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc.

100. IND. CoDE § 4-21.5-3-25(b) (1988) provides:
"The administrative law judge shall regulate the course of the proceedings ...
in an informal manner without recourse to the technical, common rules of
evidence applicable to civil actions in the courts."
IND. ConE § 4-21.5-3-34 (1988) provides:
''An agency is encouraged to develop informal procedures that are consistent
with this article and make unnecessary more elaborate proceedings under this
article.

